Abstract Icelandic case agreement suggests that nominative case is active in PRO infinitives in much the same way as in finite clauses, thus posing a difficult and a long-standing problem for generative (GB and minimalist) case theory and the PRO Theorem. In this article, I examine the Icelandic facts in detail, illustrating that the unmarked and common nominative morphology in Icelandic PRO infinitives is regular structural nominative morphology, suggesting that PRO cannot be reduced to a copy. What went wrong in the GB approach to PRO was not PRO itself but the binding theoretic and 'Case' theoretic conception of it. PRO is an empty category that is simultaneously a reference variable (like overt pronouns and anaphors) and a phi-feature variable (unlike overt expressions). Due to this unique combination of variable properties, PRO cannot be deduced from other traits of grammar, such as movement, nor can it possibly be lexicalized. Importantly, also, the facts studied here suggest that case is a post-syntactic category, assigned in morphology. In contrast, Person is evidently a syntactically active category, having some of the properties and effects that have commonly been attributed to 'Case'.
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PRO in the GB-theoretic sense is incompatible with minimalist assumptions, not only because it is a derivative of the abandoned binding principles, but also, and more seriously, because 'anaphoric' and 'pronominal' are labels that only describe the distribution and behavior of different kinds of anaphoric items in GB-theoretic terms. That is, these notions are themselves not features of language, and hence they are not accessible or visible to syntax as objects or units, as is evident by the fact that they get no interpretation at the semantic interface. 1 There are thus good reasons to want to eliminate GB-theoretic PRO from syntactic theory. 2 The simplest way of doing so is of course to use Occam's razor, claiming that the whole issue was a misconception and that there is either nothing there or that it reduces to something else. The movement theory of control takes the latter track, claiming that PRO is a copy and that obligatory control arises from movement, whereby an argument is moved from a theta position, A, in the PRO clause to a distinct theta position, B, in the control clause. See Hornstein (1999 Hornstein ( , 2001 Hornstein ( , 2003 and Boeckx and Hornstein (2003, 2004) .
The movement theory of control has been criticized by Landau (e.g., 2003) . 3 Landau bases some of his many arguments on the Icelandic case agreement facts described and discussed in Sigurðsson (1991 , see also Sigurðsson 2002 . In reply to Landau, Boeckx and Hornstein (2006: 592) argue:
that no currently entertained theory of control can accommodate the reported Icelandic data without alteration. Thus, these data cannot by themselves argue either for a PRO-based account of control or against a movement-based account, as is tacitly assumed and occasionally asserted. (original emphasis)
Boeckx and Hornstein, henceforth B&H, imply that they have considered "the facts...in their entirety " (2006: 604) . However, their presentation of the Icelandic facts is inadequate and misleading. Since these facts figure prominently in the ongoing debate on PRO, it is important that they be presented correctly. One of my primary aims here is to do so. As we will see, the simplest interpretation of these facts is that there is indeed 'something' where GB theory postulated PRO and that this 'something' is not only case-marked (structurally or inherently) but also grammatically phi-feature-marked. Thus, we seem to have a paradoxical situation, a clash between a theoretically reasonable conclusion (that GB-theoretic PRO was an aberration) and robust facts that contradict that conclusion. However, I will argue that the root of the problem is not PRO itself, but the GB-theoretic conception of it in terms of binding and 'Case'. I analyze PRO as a reference and a phi-feature variable, θREF α /phi β , i.e., an empty thematic category that has both variable reference, like overt pronouns and anaphors, and (fully) variable phi-features, unlike overt expressions. This category is arguably assigned both case and phi-feature values by processes that apply in morphology and not in syntax. It follows that its case-marking does not really bear on the abstract 'Case' approach to the silence problem posed by PRO (i.e., the fact that PRO cannot be spelled out as an overt pronoun). That is, much as in the approach of Chomsky (1981) , PRO infinitives seem to lack some property or properties that would license the lexicalization of their thematic subject. The silence problem is thus real and needs to be accounted for. I demonstrate that the movement theory of control does not remove the problem, instead raising new questions and complications. I then proceed by pointing out that the silence problem is twofold. First, PRO infinitives are 'defective' with respect to (subject) Person and this is presumably the basic reason why PRO cannot be spelled out, that is, Person comes close to being the category that has commonly been referred to as 'Case'. Second, however, PRO infinitives are subject to a more general left edge silence requirement or Anti-EPP Effect, blocking not only the lexicalization of PRO itself, but also alternative 'left edge lexicalization strategies', like expletive insertion, topicalization and Stylistic Fronting. A more general theory of the clausal left edge is required if linguistics is to develop any deeper understanding of this second (largely unnoticed) silence problem.
The participants in the ongoing debate on control and PRO deviate from 'standard GB vocabulary' in several ways. Thus, Landau (2006) refers to empty subjects in Greek and Romanian subjunctives as PRO and B&H refer to empty subjects in nonobligatory control contexts as pro. For ease of reference, I will be using the notion PRO in the standard sense of Chomsky (1981 Chomsky ( , 1982 .
The relevant Icelandic facts all involve items in PRO infinitives that show distant morphological reflections of case. The items in question are case agreeing elements of roughly three sorts:
& adjectival and participial (primary) predicates & floating quantifiers & other case-agreeing elements (indefinite pronouns, secondary predicates, ...) I will discuss these elements in section 2. Some of the relevant facts are subject to certain variation among speakers. Icelandic linguists have mentioned some of the variation in their works (e.g., Friðjónsson 1977 Friðjónsson , 1989 Thráinsson 1979 Thráinsson , 2005 Sigurðsson 1991 Sigurðsson , 2002 , but in order to get a clearer picture of it, I made a small informant survey, to which I will occasionally refer. 4 In the next section, I describe and discuss the basic facts of case agreement in Icelandic PRO infinitives, and in section 3, I discuss some more variable facts. Section 4 compares the different case properties of raising and control in Icelandic. In section 5, I present my analysis of PRO as a reference and phi-feature variable and discuss the general properties of PRO and PRO infinitives. Section 6 concludes the article.
The basic facts
Icelandic is a moderately rich case language (with NOM, ACC, DAT, GEN), but it is an unusually rich case agreement language, and it is this property that enables us to see that PRO is indeed case active in this language. The core fact is that PRO usually triggers case agreement in infinitives in the same fashion as overt subjects do in finite clauses. Importantly, also, Icelandic has quirky or non-nominative subjects as well as nominative ones, and it can be shown that quirky PRO and overt quirky subjects trigger the same kind of agreement, whereas nominative PRO and overt nominative subjects trigger another kind of agreement. I sketch the general pattern in (1) and (2), where X is either an element showing case agreement with its subject or showing up in a default, non-agreeing form, DFT, that is nonetheless dependent on the (quirky) case of the subject (the order of the elements may vary in finite clauses): Examples illustrating this will be presented in the following subsections.
Predicative adjectives and past participles
Consider the agreement facts for predicative adjectives illustrated below (the same facts pertain to past participles). For clarity, the agreement triggering item is underlined whereas the agreeing element is set in boldface, a convention I will be using throughout:
(3) Ólafur er ríkur/*ríkan/*ríkum/*ríks. Grammatical features that are directly translatable by the English glosses (e.g., the number of most arguments) are not specifically pointed out, as that would only make it harder for the reader to process the glosses. Olaf.D.M.SG finds good to N be rich.N.M.SG 'Olaf finds it nice to be rich.'
Notice that the matrix subject is accusative in (4a) and dative in (4b); that is, the nominative of the adjective ríkur cannot arise by inheritance of the matrix subject's case. 7 The remaining possibilities are local case agreement with nominative PRO or default nominative. B&H (2006) assume the second alternative, but, as we shall see, that assumption is untenable.
Predicative adjectives and participles that take a quirky subject (and do not also take a nominative object, see below) show up in an invariable, default form, regardless of the gender and number of the quirky subject.
8 This is illustrated in (5):
(5) a. Honum er kalt/*kaldur/*köldum. she.N said that it could not be good to D be cold.DFT 'She said that it could not be nice to be (feeling) cold.'
Most predicates of this sort can also be construed with a nominative subject, with different semantics, cf. (8) and (9) (similar case-semantic facts are found in many 7 However, such inheritance is possible in certain cases. I will return to this. 8 This form is always homophonous with agreeing N/A.NT.SG forms. I mark it as DFT in the glosses. 6 The infinitive marker að is usually taken to be a complementizer, hence its position in front of PRO The relevant generalizations are as follows, where X stands for a predicative adjective or a past participle:
(10) a. X is blocked from agreeing with an NP 1 to which it assigns inherent case. b. X agrees with a structurally case-marked CP-internal NP 2 , if there is one.
c. In the absence of a CP-internal structurally case-marked NP, X shows up in an invariable non-agreeing default form.
Given that PRO may be assigned either inherent or structural case, just like overt NPs (as argued in Sigurðsson 1989 in Sigurðsson : 183ff, 1991 , these generalizations hold for PRO infinitives as well as for finite clauses. This is illustrated in (11) and (12) The participle forms sagt and lesið in (13a) and (14a) are non-agreeing, default forms, whereas the forms sögð and lesin in (13b) and (14b) agree with their nominative 'neighbors', an object in (13b) and a subject in (14b).
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The relevant generalization is this: Whenever there is a CP-internal NP with structural case, a predicative adjective or a past participle shows up in an agreeing form, otherwise it takes a default non-agreeing form. Thus, if PRO could not be assigned structural nominative case, we would expect predicative adjectives and participles to always show up in the non-agreeing default form -since that is the form they otherwise take in the absence of a structurally case marked NP. That this is not the case is seen in the nominative PRO examples in (4), (11a) and (12a) above and is further illustrated in (15) For clarity, I summarize the central observations so far:
(16) a. Only those predicative adjectives and past participles that agree in finite clauses can show agreement in PRO infinitives. b. Predicative adjectives and past participles agree with a CP-internal nominative NP, if there is one. c. Those predicative adjectives and past participles that assign inherent case to their subjects (and do not take a structurally case-marked object to agree with) exclusively show up in an invariable non-agreeing default form, in PRO infinitives as well as in finite clauses.
These generalizations are exceptionless, valid for all speakers of Icelandic, and describe a central trait of Icelandic grammar. They are simply accounted for if Icelandic PRO is assigned structural or quirky case in the same fashion as overt subject NPs in finite clauses. On any other approach, these agreement patterns would be mysterious. B&H do not discuss these patterns. On the other hand, they discuss certain less central facts, where there is some speaker variation. I will now turn to these facts. As we shall see, the variation is limited and in fact irrelevant for the issue at stake, the case-marking of PRO.
Floating quantifiers
Icelandic floating quantifiers show gender, number and case agreement with their quantified NPs. I illustrate this for subjects in finite clauses in (17) There are two minor caveats here, though. First, not all predicates can be easily embedded as PRO infinitives under all control predicates. In particular, quirky PRO is usually rather low in acceptability when controlled by an agentive subject of a verb like reyna 'try'.
11 Second, many speakers are reluctant to embed floating quantifiers in control infinitives, "presumably for scope reasons" (Sigurðsson 1991: 332) .
12 B&H (2006, fn. 5) refer to these caveats as "important", and from the point of view of a detailed language description they certainly are. 13 However, for the issue at stake here, the case-marking of PRO, they are trivially unimportant. What matters here is this:
& First: Quirky PRO is generally acceptable in Icelandic (but agentive control of non-agentive PRO is commonly awkward, not least when PRO is quirky). & Second: Floating quantifiers are grammatical albeit a bit marked in control infinitives (as their narrow scope in relation to the matrix predicate usually requires a collective reading). & Third: When floating quantifiers are embedded in control infinitives, they normally comply with the pattern described in (17)-(19) above.
The simplest account of the observed facts is that Icelandic PRO is assigned structural and inherent case in the same manner as overt subjects in comparable finite clauses, hence also triggering quantifier agreement in the same manner as overt subjects.
Other case agreeing elements
Secondary predicates and indefinite pronouns of various sorts, sometimes referred to as 'semipredicates', show in many ways similar properties as floating quantifiers.
13 B&H (2006, fn. 5) claim that my reference to scope is "in fact...only valid for instances of quirky-Casemarked floating quantifiers", but that is incorrect. In this same footnote B&H indicate that there is some important difference between my and Thráinsson's grammars with respect to case agreement in infinitives, saying: "Despite these rather important reservations concerning the acceptability of the relevant Icelandic data, we will restrict attention to those speakers of Icelandic who have internalized the empirical picture described in Sigurðsson (1991) . For other speakers, such as Thráinsson, Icelandic behaves exactly like English." This is incorrect. There is no relevant difference in this respect between the grammar described in Sigurðsson (1991) and the grammar described by Thráinsson (1979 Thráinsson ( : 297ff, 1993 Thráinsson ( : 205ff, 2005 Thráinsson ( : 415ff, 2007 .2), or, for that matter, the Icelandic grammar described by other Icelandic linguists, e.g., Eythórsson and Barðdal (2005) . See further below.
11 See Thráinsson (1979: ch. 5) , where it is shown that this is also, to an extent, true of nonagentive nominative PRO; see also Eythórsson and Barðdal (2005: 851ff) . Quirky PRO is usually acceptable when uncontrolled and when embedded under a non-agentive control predicate. 12 The examples in (18) were ruled grammatical by 14 (18a) and 13 (18b) of my 15 informants. My use of 'brothers' as a subject there is not a coincidence. Floating quantifiers in infinitives usually require a (marked) collective rather than a distributive reading, and it is relatively easy to get a collective reading for relational nouns like 'brothers'. Thus, the general acceptability of these examples is in part a consequence of the 'natural collectivity' of the matrix subject. If the quantifiers are instead placed in the matrix clauses, thereby taking scope over the matrix verb, the (unmarked) distributive reading is mandatory (cf. English distributed Both the brothers were annoyed by not being elected, as compared to the collective and marked The brothers were annoyed not to be both elected). On the distributive reading there are two 'likings' and 'wishings', as it were, but on the collective reading there is only a single but collective 'liking' or 'wishing' (which is marked, given the plurality of the 'likers'/'wishers'). This is the scope effect mentioned in Sigurðsson (1991: 332) , which B&H (2006, fn. 5) discard as "puzzling", arguing that "something less universal than scope is at issue". Olaf.D was-bored to D be-bored alone.D in party.the Again, it is evident that the case source is internal to the PRO infinitive. As we shall see shortly, however, there are certain exceptions to this generalization.
The facts in (20)- (23) are the central facts. However, some less central and more variable facts also exist. I will address the most important of these in the next section. Before proceeding, however, I highlight the relevant generalizations so far:
1. Predicative adjectives and past participles that assign quirky case to their subject never agree with it, regardless of whether it is an overt NP 1 or PRO.
Instead, they either show up in a default, non-agreeing form (like kalt 'cold'), which is the common pattern, or agree with a structurally case-marked CPinternal NP 2 (an object), if there is one. 2. Predicative adjectives (like kaldur 'cold') and past participles agree with their nominative subject, regardless of whether it is an overt NP or PRO. 3. Floating quantifiers show nominative agreement with nominative subjects and quirky agreement with quirky subjects, regardless of whether the subject is an overt NP or PRO. 4. Semipredicates or indefinite pronouns like einn 'alone, one (in number)' usually agree with their subject, nominative or quirky, regardless of whether it is an overt NP or PRO. 14 3 Transmission of case
As we have seen, the source of the case of an agreeing element in PRO infinitives is normally infinitive internal, as sketched in (24) Sigurðsson " indicates that for him, the nominative form...is fully acceptable" and contend that their "interpretation of his judgments is that he has generalized the use of default nominative Case in non-finite contexts". This is incorrect. I have not "indicated" this. I find nominatives of this sort degraded, ?, but not sharply ungrammatical (in contrast to the dative form einum, which is perfect, and the accusative form einan, which is impossible). As is evident from the description in Thráinsson (1979: 297ff) , some speakers (including 4 of my 15 informants) find nominatives of this sort acceptable, presumably because they analyze einn 'alone' as a reduced predicate, 'being alone' (nominal predicates normally being nominative in Icelandic).
That is, the basic nominative case morphology of an infinitive may be 'overwritten' by the case of the controller of PRO. The kind of variation that arises is illustrated in (26) There do not seem to be any semantic correlates to the optionality of case transmission versus local nominative case, a fact that indicates that the optionality is a shallow morphological phenomenon, rather than a syntactic one (see the discussion in section 5.2).
I will turn to the analysis of case assignment in section 5.2, but here I would like to stress that case transmission is a limited phenomenon. Thus, it never applies to quirky PRO infinitives. A factor that contributes to this is that controlled quirky PRO is sometimes low in acceptability, as mentioned above. However, that is clearly not the sole reason, as seen by the contrast between (28) and (29) Olaf.D found pleasurable to be the-first-one.D
Examples of this sort were common in Old Norse (Friðjónsson 1977 (Friðjónsson , 1989 , and they are evidently also attested in Modern Icelandic, at least sporadically. I myself find them all acceptable, but marked.
17 For an instructive cross-linguistic study of similar (but variable) case transmission phenomena, see Landau (2007) . 18 I do not have any clear picture of this effect since it varies from speaker to speaker and from construction to construction. At least for some speakers and some constructions the copular verbs vera 'be' and verða 'will be, become' are more transparent to case transmission than more contentful verbs. Also, it seems, case transmission is the more likely (other things being equal), the more local it is. 19 B&H (2006, fn. 6) claim that "Instances of object control constructions where the object controller bears quirky Case are very limited (we suspect that this is due to the very narrow semantic range of verbs taking quirky objects (mostly experiencer predicates)." In fact, however, Icelandic has an unusually broad range of verbs that take dative objects ("quirky" in B&H's terms), with various thematic and aspectual properties (e.g., Barðdal 2001; Maling 2002; Jónsson 2005; Thráinsson 2007; Sigurðsson 2007d) . Some common verbs with a dative object controller: banna 'forbid', bjóða 'offer', gera 'make, oblige', kenna 'teach', leyfa 'allow', lofa 'allow', meina 'hinder', ráðleggja 'advise', segja 'tell', skipa 'order', skrifa 'write to'.
Depending on speakers, then, nominative is normally either the only possible form or the unmarked form in examples of this sort, as illustrated in (31) In fact, it is trivially obvious that 'basically nominative' PRO infinitives normally retain their nominative morphology, as exemplified in (33), for the simple reason that the optimal conditions for case transmission only apply to a small minority of such infinitives: B&H's claim that nominative case in Icelandic PRO infinitives is "default" and "can be assigned indirectly in control as a rather marked option" (2006: 601, original emphasis) is incorrect and remarkable. It is the opposite that is true: case transmission, overwriting basic nominative morphology, is either marked or excluded, with the exception of ACC transmission under object control (see further below). B&H (2006: 596) take nominatives in Icelandic PRO infinitives to be default case "as there is no source for structural nominative in the embedded clause". However, what the Icelandic facts illustrate is precisely that there is an independent source for structural nominative case in infinitives (as argued in Sigurðsson 1989 Sigurðsson , 1991 The movement theory of control does not extend to uncontrolled empty subjects, which B&H therefore assume to be pro rather than PRO. However, since structural nominative case is obligatory in infinitives like the ones in (34), it is hard to see how it can, in principle, be excluded from being available in control infinitives as well.
To repeat: Basic nominative morphology in Icelandic infinitives is most commonly not overwritten by external case transmission, and in most types of examples the external case is either ungrammatical or a marked option, depending on speakers (and examples). There is only one exception to this general picture, namely ACC transmission under object control, which is quite generally accepted. However, even for this kind of examples, infinitive internal nominative agreement is acceptable or preferable to many speakers in at least many cases. We saw an example of this in (26a). More examples are given in (35): (35) I myself find these regular nominatives perfect, whereas the corresponding accusative forms (eina, sjálfa, komna, seina) are all marked for me, albeit a bit varyingly so (on the borderline between a question mark and just 'marked'). Most of my informants reported similar intuitions, as illustrated below:
Accusative agreement morphology:
ok ? * 35 ð Þ_ a1: we asked Mary:A to go not out alone:A 5 8 2 b1: we asked Mary:A to sin g self :A in party:the 9 5 1 c1: we asked her:A to be come:A clock ten 9 4 2 d1: we asked her:A to be not always so late:A 8 4 3
Nominative agreement morphology: ok ? * 35 ð Þ_ a2: we asked Mary:A to go not out alone:N 11 3 1 b2: we asked Mary:A to sin g self :N in party:the 12 2 1 c2: we asked her:A to be come:N clock ten 11 2 2 d2: we asked her:A to be not always so late:N 11 3 1 B&H's claim that the nominative morphology is "rather marked" is thus untrue. It is worth pointing out, however, that B&H could always claim that these nominatives are 'default', assigned by some last resort mechanism. The reason why they can make such a claim without any cost or risk is that they do not have any theory of 'default case', as should be clear from the following passage (B&H 2006: 602): We speculate that the marked default nominative Case on the floating quantifier...is a distance effect. That is,...the NP and the floating quantifier are separated by an infinitival clause boundary. ... This is just a speculation, and clearly not a deep explanation. ... Treating nominative assignment...as... resulting from the distance between the two targets of Agree is one way of capturing marginal facts without deriving them in a deep way.
Obviously, there is no way of putting these speculations to any theoretical test so I will not try to. Let me however point out that DAT-NOM constructions may be embedded under control verbs. That is, there are cases where the nominative is in fact an overt full argument, as in (36) below; as before, the agreeing element, here a passive participle, is set in boldface while the agreement trigger, here a nominative object, is underlined: Crucially, nominative objects in examples of this sort trigger obligatory agreement of passive past participles (which in turn assign dative case to PRO). However, if the notion of 'default nominative' is to make sense as a different notion than 'structural nominative', one would expect it to differ from the latter precisely in being an elsewhere case, invisible to agreement. Notice further that nominative objects like the ones in (36) trigger not only participle agreement but also verb agreement in finite clauses, as illustrated in (37) That is, these nominatives seem indeed to be examples of "true structural nominative", to use B&H's own words (2006: 595) , where they base their argumentation on the assumption that finite verb agreement correlates with "true structural nominative" (but see further section 6). Icelandic is unusual in overtly marking many of its nominatives in morphology. Even so, it is reasonable to analyze nominative as the unmarked case in Icelandic, as in many other languages. However, that is generally true of the nominative, in finite clauses as well as in non-finite clauses and also in non-clausal structures. What matters here is that the Icelandic nominative is evidently the same case in infinitives as in finite clauses. Thus, if it does not count in infinitives, then it should not count in finite clauses either and the question of whether or not PRO differs from overt subjects with respect to nominative case-marking becomes categorically impossible to test -an unscientific question.
Control versus raising
Icelandic raising and control constructions display very different case properties (as pointed out by Thráinsson 1986: 252) . The case of the overt member of a 'control chain' is decided 'upstairs', by some element or property of the matrix clause, whereas the case of the overt member of a raising chain is decided 'downstairs', in the infinitive raised from. 21 This holds across the structural/quirky case distinction and can thus be simply sketched as follows: (38 Andrews (1990: 205ff) reports that 2-3 of his 17 informants accept some control examples with the overt case coming from downstairs and that one of his informants accepts a raising example with an upstairs case instead of the regular downstairs case. 22 Landau cites examples (2003: 492, his (41a-c) ) that are supposed to show this, attributing them to O'Neil (1997) . Unfortunately, these examples are ungrammatical (for independent reasons), but the argument is valid.
Thus, Icelandic raising is like Icelandic passive in 'preserving' inherent case (Zaenen, Maling and Thráinsson 1985, and The fact that control so sharply differs from NP-movement/raising with respect to case preservation would seem to provide a decisive argument against the movement theory of control. However, B&H (2006, fn. 19) argue that this is not the case, the reason being that control movement is distinct from raising. Remarkably, though, B&H do not explain the difference nor do they present any analysis of case preservation under NP-movement/raising. Let us nonetheless consider B&H's story for 'non-preservation of case' under control and try to find out what it predicts for 'preservation of case' under raising. Recall that control in B&H's approach involves movement from one theta-position to another. Thus, they suggest the following derivation of control examples like (40a), with a nominative morphology in the matrix clause and a quirky morphology downstairs; X denotes an assigner (V or A) of θ-role/quirky case:
Step 1: NP is assigned downstairs θ-role/DAT by X (NP sharing DAT with 'both') b.
Step 2: matrix V attracts NP and assigns a θ-role to it c.
Step 3: matrix T assigns structural Case to NP, which moves to check EPP The 'control chain', thus, is assigned two cases, one quirky downstairs and one structural in the matrix clause. B&H contend (2006: 600ff) that the "Case value that surfaces on the moving element...is always the highest Case value" and that it is "plausible to assume that Case is morphologically realized only once (just as only one member of a chain is pronounced), according to the context in which the NP is pronounced (highest copy)."
Given this approach to case marking in control constructions, one would have to assume that quirky raising, as in (40b), moves an NP to the matrix left edge, 'to check EPP', without being assigned structural case by the matrix T (and also without passing through any matrix θ-position). This, as such, is not inconceivable, but, crucially, the traditional explanations, that inherently case-marked NPs either 'absorb' or 'repel' structural case, would not account for the absence of overt structural case-marking in quirky raising, since the opposite is precisely what happens to controlled quirky NPs on B&H's account. What their analysis thus boils down to is a claim to the effect that assignment or matching of a 'nominative' matrix θ-role, i.e., a θ-role that does not relate to inherent case, suppresses inherent (θ-related) case.
Moreover, raised non-quirky NPs do trigger finite verb agreement, just as nominative controllers, illustrating the generally acknowledged fact that raised arguments have more 'matrix errands' than just "to check EPP": we.N seem.1PL/*3SG both.N have been elected 'We both seem to have been elected.'
The movement theory of control greatly complicates the analysis of all these facts. The plain generalization is that the matrix NOM is activated whenever the matrix clause contains a non-quirky NP, irrespective of control or raising, and that structural case never suppresses or overwrites inherent case once it has been assigned, as has long been the received understanding (Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson 1985 , inter alia).
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On the properties of PRO and PRO infinitives
In the previous sections I have described and discussed case-related agreement of predicative adjectives and participles (section 2.1), case agreement of floating quantifiers (2.2) and of indefinite pronouns like einn 'alone' (2.3), case transmission into PRO infinitives (section 3), and the different case patterns seen in control and raising constructions (section 4). All these facts illustrate that the challenges posed by PRO are real and cannot be simply eliminated by a movement approach. The question we need to deal with is not how to dispense with PRO but how to understand and accommodate it. I will now address this question, arguing, in section 5.1, that PRO is an empty reference and phi-feature variable that is necessarily a part of grammar. In section 5.2, I discuss morphological case and claim that it does not bear on the 'Case' approach to PRO. In sections 5.3 and 5.4, I take a closer look at the silence problem posed by PRO itself and, more generally, the left edge of PRO infinitives, showing that these are two (interrelated) phenomena, rather than a single one. The category that is most directly 'responsible' for the silence of PRO as such is argued to be defective Person, case, on the other hand, being irrelevant.
PRO as a reference/phi-feature variable
Even though the GB-theoretic conception of PRO as a [+anaphoric, +pronominal] category must be dispensed with, it is evident that PRO neither reduces to nothingness nor to a movement copy. What the Icelandic facts demonstrate, beyond doubt, is that there is something there, visible to both the interfaces (albeit only 24 As also supported by the fact observed above that case never transmits into quirky PRO infinitives.
indirectly visible in PF, through agreement). In the following, I will argue that this 'something' behaves like overt pronouns (both personal pronouns and anaphors) in having variable reference, simultaneously being unlike overt expressions in also having (fully) variable phi-features. It is this dual variability that sets PRO apart from other pronominal and anaphoric elements. 25 This characteristic of PRO does not seem to follow from other traits or phenomena of grammar, such as movement.
PRO is a thematic element that has variable reference, as simply illustrated in (44): (44) The reference of PRO in examples like (44a,b) is decided under control, where the controller is either the matrix subject, as in (44a), or a non-subject, as in (44b). In (44c), PRO is not controlled by any argument, therefore having unspecified reference. Such PRO is commonly referred to as arbitrary (or generic), a term that I will adopt here. These facts have been widely discussed in the generative literature (see for instance Landau 2000 and his subsequent work).
Since PRO is a thematic element, θ, that has variable reference we may descriptively refer to it as a reference variable, as stated in (45): (45) PRO = θREF α I do not assign any special theoretical status to the notion reference variable. Rather, it is just a descriptive label that highlights the fact that the thematic element commonly referred to as PRO has variable reference. Overt pronouns are also reference variables in this simple, descriptive sense (see shortly).
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As illustrated in (44) above, the reference or the value of θREF α is either copied under control from one or more overt or construed antecedents, X, or a non-copied, arbitrary (or generic) one: (47) a. John: "I saw the cake before you did." b. Mary: "No, I saw it first, and you better not touch it!"
The singular pronouns I and you are variables denoting the SPEAKER and the HEARER, whoever they happen to be in a given utterance situation or SPEECH EVENT (see further shortly), that is, there is nothing that could be referred to or understood as a constant 'I-meaning' or 'you-meaning'. Similarly, there is no constant 'he-meaning', 'they-meaning', etc., pronouns like he and they instead being variables, denoting an individual or individuals the speaker assumes to be known/given in the speech event or in the recent discourse. Pro in non-agreement languages like Chinese illustrates the same point for silent pronouns, and so does PRO. Reflexives and reciprocals are reference variables par excellence, of course.
Blocking syntax from operating with empty reference variables (or empty categories/pronouns, if one likes) is not only stipulative, thereby violating the Strong Minimalist Thesis (cf. Chomsky 2005), it is also empirically refuted. As we have seen, Icelandic case facts bear on this issue, illustrating that PRO usually carries 'its own' case, thereby rendering the movement approach to PRO unattractive. Moreover, case is not the only morphological feature carried by Icelandic PRO. It is also phi-feature specified. This is for instance suggested by overt gender and number agreement, as illustrated in (48) The simplest account of these facts is that PRO inherits both the reference and the phi-features of its controller and then triggers CP-internal agreement, in the same fashion as overt nominative phi-featured subjects do in finite clauses: First and second person reflexives are homophonous with first and second person pronouns in Icelandic (and the other Scandinavian languages), but, as shown, mig 'me, myself' can only function as a reflexive in (52a) and only as a non-reflexive pronoun in (52b) (yielding the somewhat strange but grammatical reading 'it is not pleasurable for people in general to hurt me'). As seen, it is not a problem to have the first person feature, as such, in (non-subject position in) the infinitive in (52b). However, PRO itself cannot carry 1st or 2nd person except under 1st and 2nd person control, as in (52a).
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This observation about the special status of person is important and I will return to it in section 5.4. In the present context, however, it is a bit of a sidetrack. The central point I wish to make in this section is that PRO has variable reference and variable phi-features, and that these variable properties of PRO are sometimes copied from an overt controller and sometimes decided by other means, independently of overt control. In simple cases of exhaustive (rather than partial) obligatory control, and where there is also no case distinction between the controller and PRO, a movement approach could derive the observed facts. In all other cases, it has no account to offer.
Even B&H assume that uncontrolled infinitives like (50), (51) and (52b) have an empty category, but, as previously mentioned, they refer to it as pro rather than as PRO (raising questions about pro that I will not address here). Whatever we call this category, it is evident that grammar operates with an empty category, EC, that has variable reference and variable phi-features as sketched in (53), even in the absence of an overt controller or 'feature sharer' (usually, α and β co-vary but I do not indicate this):
(53) EC = θREF α /phi β Given this fact, there is no gain in specifically blocking this EC from occurring in control contexts. On the contrary: Such a ban does not follow from any general principles of grammar, as far as can be seen, and is thus stipulative, marking a setback and not a progress in the development of syntactic theory and our understanding of language. 31 5.2 Case is assigned in post-syntactic morphology Two fundamental problems remain. First, case does not seem to even relate to the question of why PRO must not be spelled out. Second, no other obvious account of the silence of PRO seems to offer itself. Notice that this silence problem is not resolved by the movement theory of control. It raises the (unanswered) question of why controllers should have to move, which is essentially the same question as the question of why PRO cannot be spelled out in situ.
31 Notice that phi-feature inheritance or copying under control, e.g., in examples like (48) above (/the women promised me to sing alone. N.F.PL/, etc.) illustrates that PRO infinitives can be externally probed. That is, as mentioned in fn. 2 above, control infinitives are not full phases, hence the EC is not blocked from occurring in control contexts by the Phase Impenetrability Condition. 30 Some speakers of English accept at least some examples like It was necessary to hurt myself (as opposed to *It is necessary to hurt myself, (Joan Maling, p.c.)). Possibly, it is harder to construe a silent 'free dative' in Icelandic than in English (It was necessary [for me] to hurt myself), free datives being rather restricted in Icelandic (see Thráinsson 2007: 218ff) .
In this section, I will argue that syntax has no case features and that case, including the case of Icelandic PRO, is assigned in post-syntactic morphology (thus not really bearing on the 'Case' approach to PRO). In sections 5.3 and 5.4, I will argue that the silence problem posed by PRO is real, but that there is also another more general left edge silence requirement or an Anti-EPP Effect in PRO infinitives (largely unnoticed in the literature). Since the silence problem posed by PRO cannot be accounted for in terms of case, an alternative understanding of it needs to be developed. I propose that the relevant category is defective Person, compatible with a phi-feature variable (PRO) but incompatible with phi-specified items.
Case poor languages like English and French show a considerable overlapping of morphological case and the licensing and distribution of arguments. The idea that case is a syntactic feature, controlling or licensing the lexicalization of arguments, is thus suggestive for such languages. However, only a cursory glance at moderately rich case languages like Icelandic, German and Russian indicates that case does not really have any syntactic effects, while it has morphological agreement correlates. Case is telling about both morphology and syntax, but it does not seem to be a driving force in the (syntactic) derivation.
Facts bearing on this issue have been thoroughly discussed in the generative case literature so thoroughly that specific references become almost pointless. Since I cannot do any justice to all the important contributions to this research field, I only refer the reader to some of my own work (see, in particular, Sigurðsson 1989 Sigurðsson , 1991 Sigurðsson , 2003 Sigurðsson , 2006a Sigurðsson , 2006b Sigurðsson , 2006c Sigurðsson , 2007a Sigurðsson , 2007b Sigurðsson , 2007d and to Zaenen, Maling, and Thráinsson (1985) , Marantz (2000) , McFadden (2004) , Nomura (2005) , and the numerous references cited in these works. I cannot review but a part of the relevant observations and facts here, so I will only mention a few of the most central ones. In the interest of space and readability, I will partly illustrate the facts with only English glosses.
Icelandic quirky subjects show the same behavior as nominative subjects in the language with respect to regular definite NP-movement, reflexivization and other well established 'subjecthood tests' (in finite clauses, ECM infinitives, etc.). This fact has been so widely discussed and described (since Andrews 1976 and Thráinsson 1979 ) that I will not review it here. SUBJECT FLOATING is not as well known (although discussed in, e.g., Sigurðsson 1989 Sigurðsson , 1991 Sigurðsson , 1992 Sigurðsson , 2000 Sigurðsson , 2003 Sigurðsson , 2004d (54) a. there would some boats.DAT then probably be stolen at auction.the b. there would then some boats.DAT probably be stolen at auction.the c. there would then probably some boats.DAT be stolen at auction.the d. *there would then probably be some boats.DAT stolen at auction.the e. there would then probably be stolen some boats.DAT at auction.the 32 As seen in these and the following patterns the floating subject cannot show up between non-finite verb forms, and as also seen, this holds true irrespective of the case of the subject. One can think of several accounts of this intriguing fact, but case is not among the likely explanations.
(55) a. there would some boats.NOM then probably be sold at auction.the b. there would then some boats.NOM probably be sold at auction.the c. there would then probably some boats.NOM be sold at auction.the d.* there would then probably be some boats.NOM sold at auction.the e. there would then probably be sold some boats.NOM at auction.the The dative form of 'some boats' is einhverjum bátum, whereas the nominative form is einhverjir bátar. The case distinction between these forms does not affect their syntactic distribution or licensing.
Similar facts obtain for ECM infinitives, as illustrated by the following pattern (for Icelandic examples, see, e.g., Sigurðsson 2003: 254 Another piece of evidence comes from ECM-like infinitives with an optional dative matrix experiencer (Sigurðsson 1989, etc.) . When the dative matrix experiencer is present, it blocks the infinitival subject from raising, irrespective of its case, as illustrated by the patterns in (59) (the dative form of 'the boats' is bátunum whereas the nominative form is bátarnir): 'It seemed to me that the boats had been sold.'
In the absence of a matrix experiencer, however, the (definite) subject of the infinitive has to raise, as in (60) (for a discussion of facts of this sort, see, for instance, Sigurðsson 1989 , and Boeckx 2000 : (60) The empirical problems that have been attributed to case or the lack thereof are of course real, including nominative raising, as in the Icelandic (60b1) and in English He seems to be sick, as compared to *It seems he/him/his to be sick. However, as we see by comparing (59) and (60), the problem does not seem to relate to case -the infinitival subject position being a legitimate nominative case position, as seen in (59b). The presence of the dative matrix subject in (59b) evidently licenses the infinitival nominative subject, and it arguably does so by entering a matching relation R within the matrix clause, thereby exempting the nominative from entering that relation (a Minimal Link Condition effect). In the absence of the matrix dative, on the other hand, the nominative has to raise, as in (60b1), presumably because it has to 'stand in' for the dative by entering the matrix matching relation R. As I have argued in previous work (Sigurðsson 2003 (Sigurðsson , 2004b (Sigurðsson , 2007a (Sigurðsson , 2007d , and as I will discuss in section 5.4, the matching relation in question is arguably Person matching. If so, English *It seems he to be sick is ill-formed because expletive it is not a legitimate matcher of Person in the presence of the 'stronger' Person matcher he (i.e., the expletive is superfluous, cf. Richards 2004 , and the discussion in Sigurðsson 2007c). The same effect is seen (in both languages) in ECM examples like *It considers he/him to be sick (on an expletive reading of it) as opposed to We consider him to be sick, where we matches Person. Case offers no account of this, and appealing to Burzio's Generalization does not help, as further confirmed by the Icelandic facts in (61) The fact that case is not a driving force in the derivation falls into place if it is not a syntactic feature. This claim is coined as the NO CASE GENERALIZATION in recent work (Sigurðsson 2007b (Sigurðsson , 2007d , saying, simply: Syntax has no case features. If that is correct, case cannot be operated on or operated with in syntax (Narrow Syntax, NS, in the sense of Chomsky 2000, et seq.) , and then its irrelevance for the distribution and licensing of arguments, overt and empty, is not surprising.
Saying that syntax does not have access to case features is a different and a more radical claim than just saying that morphological case is assigned post-syntactically. However, as I have argued for this understanding in previous work, I will only present a few of the arguments in favor of it below.
In generative approaches, syntax is the module or the part of grammar that mediates between meaning and surface (PF) form, and the received understanding (in Chomsky 2000, etc.) is therefore that there are basically two types of syntactic features: features that are legible to both the interfaces, and features that are legible or interpretable to only one of the interfaces. In the latter case, the derivation crashes unless something further happens (i.e., Agree has to take place, see below), because the interfaces cannot operate with features they cannot 'interpret' or 'handle'. To use a simple metaphor, this would be something like sending aeroplane parts through the production line in a car factory -the production would crash.
Formal agreement features, like number agreement on verbs and participles in Germanic and Romance languages are contentless in the sense that their presence does not contribute anything to interpretation. This is neatly illustrated by examples like the following (see also, e.g., Verb and/or participle agreement in German, Swedish and Icelandic does not convey any meaning that is absent in the English clause in (62a). 34 The same point can be made within English (or, e.g., within earlier stages of Swedish, cf. Falk 1993: 155) . Thus, inasmuch as speakers accept clauses like The girls is here, Them is here (cf. Henry 1995), the singular verb form does not lead to poorer or different semantics than the plural in the standard The girls are here, They are here. The plural subject they is the only semantically plural element in the clauses They are here / Them is here. Repeating or copying the subject's plurality on the verb is a grammatical requirement in most varieties of English, but it does not add anything to the interpretation of the clause.
It is evident from these simple observations that some features are purely formal agreement features, with no semantic import of their own. In the approach developed by Chomsky (2000, et seq.) , such features enter an Agree correlation (for instance between a verb and its subject) and are subsequently transferred to the phonological interface but deleted prior to or under transfer to the semantic interface -hence they get no semantic interpretation. In the approach in Sigurðsson (2004c Sigurðsson ( , 2006b , formal agreement features are post-syntactic, preconditioned by syntactic Agree but added in morphology by abstract agreement (copying) processes (see further below). Either way, such features never enter the 'production line' of the semantic interface, and the derivation converges instead of crashing.
Case is arguably not a contentless agreement feature in this sense. 35 That it is not is suggested by many studies of case semantics, revealing interesting (or curious), albeit language-specific form-meaning patterns (for a general overview, see Blake 2001; on Icelandic specifically, see Jónsson 2003 Jónsson , 2005 . Thus, we might seem to be forced to assume that case is a syntactic feature, and that is indeed the generally received understanding. However, the problems that arise under a syntactic approach to case are numerous and serious.
First, as we have seen, case has no bearing on the distribution and licensing of arguments, whether overt or silent, that is, it is syntactically inert (and, thus, evidently invisible to the syntactic computation).
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Second, individual cases could not be unitary features or primitives in syntax. This is seen by the fact that the cases typically express or represent numerous complex syntactic relations. Thus, the Icelandic NOMINATIVE is used to mark NPs in the following rather heterogeneous syntactic relations:
(63) a. agentive subjects (in finite clauses) b. numerous non-agentive subjects (of various kinds of predicates) c. subjects of ECM-like infinitival and small clause complements of certain matrix verbs that take a dative subject (the type in (59b) above) d. objects of certain verbs that take a dative subject ('me would like these ideas.NOM') e. predicative NPs (in finite clauses and PRO infinitives) f. many left dislocated NPs g. many right dislocated NPs h. vocatives and other addressing expressions i. certain exclamative NPs j. most listed NPs (in dictionaries, etc.) 35 But for a suggestion that the structural cases actually are Agree markers, see Platzack (2006) . 36 Assuming that an NP has to have an 'unsatisfied' syntactic case feature in order to be syntactically active is redundant, hence vacuous (i.e., it is non-distinct from saying that the n-feature makes NPs syntactically active or from simply saying that NPs are syntactically active until they have been fully matched).
The following is an incomplete list of the Icelandic NP types that show up in the DATIVE:
(64) a. agentive NPs in af-'by' phrases in the passive b. experiencer subjects of certain predicates c. theme subjects of certain predicates d. free benefactives e. most benefactive indirect (or 'first') objects f. numerous direct objects (with certain thematic and aspectual readings) g. complements of many prepositions h. complements of certain adjectives i. certain adverbial NPs (instrumental, possessive, comparative) Many of these functions or relations are quite complex. Thus, it might seem simple enough to see to it that agentive subjects in finite clauses show up in the nominative, but it requires a rule or a statement that takes, roughly, the following form:
Similarly, the formula in (66), where +∃ stands for 'most', would see to it that most benefactive indirect objects are assigned dative case:
Notice that there is no way of linking only thematic content like BENEFACTIVE or AGENT directly with the cases, there for instance being both nominative benefactives and dative agents (in af-'by' phrases in passives). That is, the case-marking is essentially based on a combination of thematic and structural information. 38 Moreover, formulas like these can only function if the case assignment mechanism 'knows' what it is 'to belong to a finite clause' and what it is 'to be a subject' and 'to be an indirect object' (in themselves complex relations). The received GB and minimalist understanding is, however, that notions like 'subject' and 'object' (let alone 'finite clause') are not syntactic primitives (cf. Chomsky 1981: 10; McCloskey 1997) . If so, syntax does not operate on or with complex entities like subjects and objects. Rather, it 'produces' subjects and objects -which means that formulas like (65) and (66), inasmuch as they are 'real', must be operative after 'subject/object production', presumably in post-syntactic morphology.
Third, if case was a syntactic feature (or features), either legible to the semantic interface (inherent cases) or deleted prior to or under transfer to the semantic interface (structural cases), one might expect it to show up in a similar fashion across languages. However, nothing could be further from the truth. Many languages have no case-marking at all (see below) and case languages show profound case variation. 37 There are more ways to get the same result, but the technical details are not important here. The point I am making is that the cases typically represent complex relations, involving a number of factors. 38 The relevant thematic information is encoded in syntax by aspect and voice heads in the approach suggested by Svenonius (2006) and further developed in Sigurðsson (2007d If syntax operates with a +ABLATIVE feature, for instance, it is puzzling that it can, at some time point, stop doing so in some languages. Also, if syntax operates with a +NOMINATIVE feature, it is unclear why that feature should have different domains in closely related languages and why it should be assigned to NPs with many heterogeneous syntactic functions, like the ones listed in (63) above. In contrast, if the cases are not syntactic features but morphological markers, their variability and historical instability can be analyzed in similar terms as other morphological variation -by no means a trivial task, but at least a conceivable one.
Closely related languages, with basically the same case systems, can show quite different distribution and function of their cases. The dative in Icelandic and German is a clear case in point (see Maling 2001 Maling , 2002 Sigurðsson 2007d) . Also, relations that are expressed with some particular case in one language are expressed with different cases or by other means in other languages. Thus, while Finnish has PARTITIVE case, Russian and, e.g., the Germanic languages do not. However, partitive and pseudopartitive relations are often marked with the genitive in Russian, and commonly with a preposition in the Germanic languages, but also sometimes with the genitive or with no marking, as in the German pseudopartitive construction drei Flaschen Wasser 'three bottles (of) water' (see Neidle 1988; Delsing 1993; Vainikka and Maling 1996; Blake 2001; Sigurðsson 2003 for some discussion).
Languages apply various means, other than case or in addition to case, to mark the relation between an NP and its linguistic environment, including suprasegmental marking (see Sigurðsson 2003 : 326 on Swedish) and some marking of a non-NP member of the relevant syntactic relation: adpositions, particles, verbs, complementizers, adverbs, .... Nichols (1992) studied dependency marking with respect to the typological notions of A(gent)-S(ubject)-P(atient). In her sample of 155 (relevant) languages, 148 or 95.5% had some such marking, and these in turn split into about equally large groups, with and without case-marking (see Nichols 1992: 90) . This is presumably not very different from the result one might expect if different marking strategies (i.e., NP-marking (=case) vs. non-NP marking) are randomly spread across languages. Moreover, if one looks at constructions (rather than only at languages), the little available evidence there is (including Nichols' study) suggests that no marking (as in drei Flaschen Wasser) is a third, highly common alternative.
All these facts are hard to understand, in fact very surprising, if individual cases are syntactic features. In contrast, they are compatible with a view where the cases are post-syntactic morphological markers of underlying syntactic structures and correlations. If so, case instructions do not take the simple form:
"Syntactic +NOM → morphological nominative case;" "Syntactic +DAT → morphological dative case," etc.
Rather, case instructions are complex formulas, where different relations and features combine to yield a morphological case representation. Thus, to mention only one central issue, transitive NOM-ACC constructions in accusative languages like Icelandic and English arguably involve subject matching of Voice and object matching of both Voice and v* (Sigurðsson 2007d) . If so, there is no 'mention' or occurrence of case features such as +NOM (or the like, cf. McFadden 2007) until postsyntactically, case being an output of the syntactic and the morphological computation, and not its input. Hence, it is not surprising that syntax → PF transfer yields nominative in more constructions than just nominative subject constructions (cf. (63) above), +NOM being a morphological interpretation of a number of different syntactic matching relations.
It is also fair to say, I believe, that proponents of generative (GB and minimalist) Case Theory do not generally assume or argue for the simple view that the morphological cases either are or directly represent syntactic features. Rather, most researchers assume that the GB-theoretic/minimalist notion of structural case is not a morphological but an abstract one: Case, with a capital C, and not the case seen in morphology, with a lower-case c. Even so, the label 'Case', henceforth Abstract Case, is unfortunate and misleading. It suggests that the licensing of overt NPs and the silence of PRO are accounted for by the presence/absence of the same abstract mechanism as the one triggering or underlying morphological case assignment in individual languages.
Overt NP licensing and the silence of PRO are real issues and the insight that they need to be theoretically accounted for (Chomsky 1981) , rather than merely taken for granted, was groundbreaking. However, the hypothesis that they can be accounted for in terms of case or that they somehow vaguely relate to case was mistaken. As we have seen, case is irrelevant with respect to both phenomena.
Claiming that NP licensing and the silence of PRO can instead be accounted for in terms of Abstract Case, raises the question of how and why Abstract Case offers such an account, and ultimately also the question of what Abstract Case is, and of why one would wish to call it 'Case', rather than 'Tense' (cf. Pesetsky and Torrego 2001) , or, e.g., 'Mood'. To my knowledge, current Abstract Case Theory (Chomsky 2000, et seq.) offers no answers to these entirely basic and simple questions.
A common reaction to this criticism goes something like this: "We all know that there is some abstract property there, but we don't really know what it is, so let's just call it Abstract Case for convenience, there can be no harm in that." However, this is harmful, as it trivializes the issues at stake and discourages further research into their nature (thereby going against the spirit of intellectual inquiry in Chomsky 1981, et seq.) . By assigning a label like 'Abstract Case' to some Property X (or Properties X +), we accustom ourselves to it, but being accustomed to it and having a name for it does not amount to understanding it.
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Both case-marking and overt agreement take place in morphology, postsyntactically. 41 That is, these processes are not syntactic (and hence they are invisible to the semantic interface, cf. (62) above), but they can 'see' and operate on the syntactic message transferred from Narrow Syntax, NS, to the externalizing, expressive component of language.
42 This component is usually referred to as PF, which is slightly misleading, but regardless of what we call it, it is a complex, layered system, with roughly the following ordered sub-interfaces in oral languages (see Sigurðsson 2006b: 204):
The units of morphology include roots, feature variables like αCASE, βGENDER and abstract feature values like NOM(inative) and FEM(inine). Thus, agreement is an abstract copying process (much as in Chomsky 1965), roughly:
The resulting abstract feature values, NOM, etc., are subsequently transferred to phonology, which interprets them in terms of phonological features. Thus, when combined with the Icelandic root /gest/ 'guest' the feature complex N.M.PL gets the phonological value /ir/, whereas it gets /ar/ when combined with the root /bát/ 'boat', in the forms gestir and bátar (roughly [Ir] and [ar] in subsequent phonetics). In contrast to the abstract morphological values, the phonological values are not copied under agreement, as illustrated in (69) 42 Accordingly, language-specific case and agreement markings can (and commonly do) represent or relate to semantic/syntactic categories, internally to individual languages. 41 Sigurðsson 2003 Sigurðsson , 2004c Sigurðsson , 2006a Sigurðsson , 2006b Sigurðsson , 2006c Sigurðsson , 2007a Sigurðsson , 2007b Sigurðsson , 2007c Sigurðsson , 2007d see also, e.g., Marantz 2000; McFadden 2004; Platzack 2006; Bobaljik 2006; Landau 2007. 40 Consider the discussion of the 'hard problems' in Chomsky (2002: 59-60) . 43 How much of 'PF' is common to oral languages and sign languages is an intriguing question. At least sign formation and some morphology would seem to have to be common.
The case and phi-features of PRO infinitives (and in general) are thus abstract features, even though they are assigned in post-syntactic morphology. The simplest assumption is that they are abstractly assigned to PRO, as sketched in (49) above. Alternatively, one might want to assume that morphology just interprets PRO infinitives as being subject to the same agreement processes as comparable finite clauses (with the obvious exception of finite verb agreement). While this second alternative is often only a notational variant (descriptively) to the first, assignment alternative, it is hard to see how it could be formalized or even only informally stated in linguistic terms. It also has the drawback that it does not easily accommodate agreement under case transmission, as there are no comparable finite clauses which the agreement mechanism could 'imitate'. 44 In short, the agreement properties of Icelandic PRO infinitives are coherently and simply accounted for under an approach where case and phi-features are abstractly assigned to PRO itself in morphology, PRO subsequently triggering morphological agreement in the same fashion as overt subjects do.
Case transmission into PRO infinitives is subject to cross-linguistic variation (see Landau 2007) . Even for only Icelandic, developing a formal account of the optionality of case transmission versus infinitive-internal nominative case-marking is not a trivial task. However, if case-marking is decided in post-syntactic morphology, such an account is at least not logically precluded, and it would also be compatible with the fact that case transmission has no discernable semantic effects or correlates (as the case is assigned in morphology, out of sight for the semantic component). If, on the other hand, case was decided in syntax, prior to transfer to the interfaces, case transmission would presumably have semantic correlates and it would also have to involve backtracking, thereby violating cyclicity and the No-Tampering Condition (Chomsky 2005) . That is to say, basic nominative case would first be assigned infinitiveinternally (see, e.g., (26a) above), and then, when a non-nominative controller is merged later on in the derivation (see, e.g., (26b) above), the computation would need to go back down into the infinitive to overwrite the original nominative with the case of the controller. 45 Case transmission illustrates that there is a cyclic matching relation between a matrix controller and an infinitival predicate, via PRO: [PRO ↔ predicate] and a subsequent [NP ↔ PRO ↔ predicate]. In the present approach, post-syntactic case may markedly 'drip down' from NP to (non-quirky) PRO and further to the infinitival predicate. More commonly, however, PRO and hence its predicate gets independent nominative case.
Case 'preservation' under A'-movement (and under quirky A-movement) has commonly been taken to be a strong indication that case is assigned in syntax. The 44 This second alternative is even less feasible in languages that show general differences between predicative agreement morphology in finite and non-finite clauses, like Russian and Ancient Greek (see Landau 2007) . 45 Alternatively, one might want to say that infinitives either come with or without a NOM head feature (cf. Landau 2007) or a NOM triggering structure, and that case transmission takes place exactly when infinitives do not come with that particular head or structure. However, this is unprincipled and also makes the wrong prediction that case transmission should be randomly spread across infinitives (equally common under quirky subject control as under object control, etc.). alternative view, argued for in my previous work (e.g., Sigurðsson 2006b (e.g., Sigurðsson , 2007d , is that PF, including morphology, is divorced from syntax, externalizing and expressing it rather than being a part of it, PF spell-out strategies scanning much wider domains than syntactic processes do (as suggested by various long distance phenomena, including case transmission). The question of why PF differs from syntax in this way is an extremely important question, but it is much too big to be addressed in passing in this article. The very least linguistics can do is identify and raise the question.
5.3
The movement theory of control does not remove the silence problem A 'control movement chain' in the sense of B&H is indistinguishable from control in the traditional sense at the semantic interface. In both analyses, the resulting structure (in simple exhaustive control configurations) is the one informally sketched in (70) below (recall, that phi-agreement takes place in morphology, hence there is no phi-variable in this semantic representation; the numbering is just a numbering of the different theta roles/features involved, not a coreference index (REF α corresponds to such an index)):
The traditional theta-criterion would exclude (70) from being derived by movement, but if θ is a feature, rather than a 'position filling element', it is not obvious that it should be blocked from probing and attracting arguments, as argued by B&H. As we have seen, however, the movement theory of control, MTC, faces serious empirical and analytical problems, and there are more.
One additional problem is that Ø/θ 1 REF α in (70) is not an exact copy of NP/ θ 2+1 REF α , since the two are partially theta-distinct. This is more clearly seen in examples like (71), illustrating that there is no limit to the number of controlled PROs:
(71) Bill wanted to ask for permission to leave early to be able to buy his tickets in time.
In terms of MTC, the highest theta feature in (71) has attracted and stacked four silent copies of Bill in the matrix Spec,IP. Presumably, the lowest copy would be attracted by a theta feature in the next infinitive up, etc., leading to a kind of roll-up, as illustrated in (72) In a theory that allows (and requires) movement from one theta position to the other there is no escape from the fact that the copies in 'domino' control structures of this sort all have matched differently many theta-features, thus not being truly identical. 46 In addition, such a theory makes PRO different from other elements of grammar in being 'potentially active' regardless of how often it is probed and matched (raising the question of why it should 'stop' being active whenever it 'hits' a finite clause). Not only may PRO and its controller be partly theta-distinct under MTC (in the sense that they match differently many theta features). As we have seen, Icelandic illustrates that PRO and its controller are commonly case-distinct as well. As a matter of fact, there is no limit to the number of distinct case-markings in 'control chains', as illustrated in (73) All this suggests that PRO and its controllers are distinct units or objects in grammar. Claims to the opposite call for a copy theory that defines exactly how different overt and covert copies can be (and what principles and mechanisms control or trigger the differences). There does not seem to be any nonstipulative, let alone reasonable way of achieving that.
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Yet another problem is that it is not clear why (case-marked) PRO should have to move. Other arguments can of course stay inside infinitives, e.g., the object him in (74), where --Mary is the putative Spec,vP copy of Mary:
Given that Mary has to move into the matrix clause, one would need to develop some coherent account of the fact that the object him does not move, yielding clauses like (75a) In short, the silence problem posed by PRO is real, and MTC does not contribute to its solution at all. On the contrary, MTC raises its own problems and introduces new complications of the theory. The single gain of it is to eliminate the GBtheoretic notion of PRO, but that is just what any minimalist approach must do. This is simply accommodated if we admit to the fact that language operates with empty categories that have not only variable reference, like overt pronouns and anaphors, but also (fully) variable phi-features, unlike overt expressions.
The silence problem(s): a closer look
While case is notably far from showing any correlation with the licensing and distribution of overt and silent arguments, person is a category that does show a close correlation with subject licensing. Reconsider the Icelandic patterns in (54) and (55), repeated below as (79) and (80) Thus, there seems to be a general requirement that 'active' or 'true' subject person, in some sense, is visualized in a high position ('Spec,IP').
51
Another fact that suggests that person plays a crucial role in 'overt subject licensing' is that quirky subjects block 1st and 2nd person agreement with nominative objects in Icelandic DAT-NOM constructions, as opposed to number agreement. This is illustrated in (84) As indicated in the diagrams to the right, this pattern is accounted for if the quirky subject enters an abstract person agreement relation with the finite verb (Boeckx 2000 , inter alia), the verb thus being blocked from also agreeing in 'true' person (as opposed to number) with the nominative object. Icelandic quirky agreement facts of this sort have been widely discussed (see, most recently, Sigurðsson and Holmberg 2007 and the references there), and I cannot go into any details regarding it here. What matters for my present purposes is the mere observation that person matching seems to be intimately related to 'subjecthood', whereas case-marking is evidently unrelated to it.
In view of all this, it is suggestive that 'true person' is incompatible with uncontrolled PRO, as we saw in (52) above, repeated here as (85); as seen, mig 'me, myself' cannot be bound by the uncontrolled PRO in (85b): (85) That is, uncontrolled PRO cannot 'bind' or co-refer with a 'true person' anaphor, whereas it can bind anaphors in the default 3rd person. This follows if PRO is never person independent, instead always carrying either the default (arbitrary/generic) 3rd person ('no person') or inheriting person from a CP external argument, typically under control (Agree).
As indicated in (84) above, and as illustrated and analyzed in considerable detail in Sigurðsson and Holmberg (2007) , the Tense, Number (Nr) and Person (Pn) features of the T-complex, T/Nr/Pn, are independently active in syntax, the spelling out of the T, Nr and Pn markers being a later morphological/PF process.
52 Following Sigurðsson (2000, et seq.) , I thus adopt the hypothesis that Person is a clausal head:
If the Person head of PRO infinitives is inherently 'defective' or anaphoric, as opposed to the Person head in finite clauses, the silence of PRO can be understood as follows:
(87) An inherently anaphoric subject Person cannot be matched by a locally (CPinternally) spelled out NP.
The reason why this is the case is presumably that any lexical NP has some (positive or negative) person specification that has to match an independent or a nondefective Person head in the clausal structure. 53 As we have seen, PRO, in contrast, is a phi-feature variable, hence compatible with an inherently unspecified Person head. That is, regardless of which person value controlled PRO inherits from its controller, the value will not violate any specification or requirement of the defective Person head of the infinitive. If this is on the right track, Person has some of the properties that have commonly been attributed to 'Case' and the EPP (see further Sigurðsson 2007d) .
Conceiving of PRO infinitives as Person-defective is close to the line of reasoning pursued by Borer (1989) , Huang (1989) , and later by Landau (e.g., 2004 ), even 52 Syntactic Person is not an uninterpretable feature, hence not a contentless Agr element in the sense of Chomsky (1995, et seq.) . What is uninterpretable is the overt morphological agreement reflection of Person, not the Person category itself. Going into further details here would take me too far afield, but I refer the reader to Sigurðsson (2004a Sigurðsson ( , 2004b Sigurðsson ( , 2004c Sigurðsson ( , 2006b Sigurðsson ( , 2007c and to Sigurðsson and Holmberg (2007 Sigurðsson (2004b Sigurðsson ( , 2007c , Speas (2004) , Bianchi (2006) , among many. Another important feature of the speech or utterance event is SPEECH TIME in the sense of Reichenbach (1947) , that is, a T feature, call it T S , in the CP-domain. 55 Given that, as we saw above, PRO cannot independently represent the 1st or the 2nd person, and given also that infinitives are Tense dependent (Landau 2004: 819ff; Sigurðsson 2007e) , it is warranted to conclude that PRO infinitives have a CP domain that has no active speech event features of its own, including the SPEAKER and the HEARER features and the SPEECH TIME or the T S feature. Accordingly, PRO infinitives are anaphoric or dependent with respect to both grammatical subject Person and (speech time related) Tense, hence incompatible with independent, local spelling out of these categories. 56 However, not only subject, Person, and Tense are blocked from being spelled out in PRO infinitives. Rather, such infinitives (in languages like Icelandic) are subject to a general left edge silence or an Anti-EPP Effect, as it were.
57 The left edge (or the leftmost 'Spec') of declarative finite clauses can be lexicalized in various ways in Icelandic (see, e.g., Rögnvaldsson and Thráinsson 1990) , for instance by a regular subject, the (non-subject) expletive það 'there, it', topicalization or 'full XP 54 In the sense of Sigurðsson (2004b Sigurðsson ( , 2007c , where the speech event is a syntactic and a much more restricted notion than in Jakobson (1959 Jakobson ( /1990 . As I argue there, 'logophoric agent' and 'logophoric patient' are more pertinent terms than the common 'speaker' and 'hearer', but the latter are sufficiently accurate here. 55 The assumption that the notions 'speaker', 'hearer' and 'speech time' are not just entities of the external, 'real world' but also internalized features of language is traditional and, as far as I am aware of, uncontroversial. On the other hand, it is a matter of debate to which module of the language faculty these features belong (cf. Huang 2007) . In the absence of any clear evidence to the contrary, and since it is arguably the simplest possible approach, I assume that they are features of the syntactic (finite) CP domain, matched by Person, Tense and other grammatical features of the IP domain. See Sigurðsson (2004b Sigurðsson ( , 2007c , where it is illustrated how this can be implemented in a minimalistic, cartographic approach to clausal structure (in the spirit of Rizzi 1997 and Cinque 1999) . However, any principled account of the lexical and syntactic activity of these features would be compatible with my purposes. Thus, the common assumption or claim that they are 'pragmatic' would be unproblematic if it could be placed within an accurate and economic theory of pragmatics and of lexicon-pragmatics and syntaxpragmatics interfaces. 56 As pointed out by a reviewer, infinitives can be 'tensed' in the sense of Stowell (1982) . However, this Stowellian type of tense relates to (non-past) event time, and not to (finite) speech time. Infinitives are indeed untensed or defective with respect to speech time, in contrast to regular finite clauses (although embedded infinitives indirectly relate to speech time, via the matrix clause). A commonly unnoticed fact is that past participles are like infinitives in being 'event time tensed' (non-future) but 'speech time untensed' (Sigurðsson 2007e SF is sometimes rather formal, but it applies commonly in finite clauses with a 'subject gap', that is to say in clauses where the canonical subject positions, Spec,IP / Spec,CP, are not occupied by a lexical subject (Maling 1980; Rögnvaldsson and Thráinsson 1990; Holmberg 2000; but see also Hrafnbjargarson 2004) . It may even apply in clauses with a thematic silent subject, such as relative clauses and interrogatives:
(90) a. Konan sem sagt hafði frá málfraeði … woman.the who told had of linguistics … 'The woman who had spoken about linguistics …' b. Það var óljóst hver sagt hafði frá málfraeði.
it was unclear who told had of linguistics 'It was unclear who had spoken about linguistics.' 58 Languages like Finnish, see Holmberg (2005) , Russian and Czech display somewhat similar variability of left edge lexicalization. 59 The same basic facts hold in main clauses, but, in general, the left edge is more variable in main clauses than in subordinate clauses, if anything.
infinitive without topicalization and (94c) shows that the topicalization is excluded in the PRO infinitive (dropping the infinitive marker would not make (94c) any better, and dropping it is in any case excluded in (94b)):
(94) a. Ég veit að þetta mál vann hann.
I know that this case won he 'I know that this case he won.' b. Hann reyndi að vinna þetta mál.
he tried to win this case c. *Hann reyndi að þetta mál vinna. he tried to this case win
The example in (95a) below shows grammatical (and preferable) expletive insertion in a finite subordinate clause, (95b) shows a comparable PRO-infinitive without an expletive, and (95c) illustrates that the expletive is excluded from the infinitive (again, dropping the infinitive marker would not make things any better, and dropping it is also excluded in (95b)):
(95) a. Ég veit að það má gera þetta. I know that it.EXPL may do this 'I know that one is allowed to do this.' b. Það er gaman að mega gera þetta. it.EXPL is nice to may do this c. *Það er gaman að það mega gera þetta.
it.EXPL is nice to it.EXPL may do this
Icelandic expletive það 'there, it' is not a subject. Thus, it does not invert with the finite verb in V1 and V2 contexts, nor does it seem to be case-marked or to ever affect agreement, 62 or show any other clear subject properties, in contrast to, e.g., the Mainland Scandinavian expletive det 'there, it' (see the seminal study of það in Thráinsson 1979 and the discussion and references in Sigurðsson 1989 Sigurðsson , 2004b Sigurðsson , 2004c . Rather, it is an optional 'left edge lexicalizer' (possible when the clause does not contain a topical constituent), competing with other elements for the preverbal, initial position, in both main clauses and most types of subordinate clauses. In spite of this 'grammatical neutrality' of það, it is categorically excluded from PRO infinitives.
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A more elaborated theory of the CP domain is needed if linguistics is to develop any deeper understanding of this Anti-EPP Effect in PRO infinitives. It suggests that PRO infinitives are 'smaller' than finite clauses, either structurally (Thráinsson 62 It is interpreted as default N/A.NT.SG in morphology, arguably as a result of absent case and phi-features (Sigurðsson 2004c, etc.) . 63 A detailed comparison with ECM infinitives and small clauses would be interesting here, but it would take us too far afield. Let me just mention that ECM constructions take an intermediate position between finite clauses and PRO infinitives, as it were. Thus, regular (accusative or quirky) infinitival subjects are, of course, compatible with ECM, and at least some instances of Stylistic Fronting are acceptable in at least certain ECM constructions, whereas það is generally degraded and topicalization is always sharply ungrammatical. 1993) or in the sense that the left edge functional domain of PRO infinitives is featurally defective or 'inactive' (in the spirit of Cinque 1999: 127) . It seems plausible to assume that the CP domain of PRO infinitives does not contain any independently active 'context-linkers' (Top(ic), Speaker, Hearer, T S , etc.) -hence its lexicalization induces an intervention or a Minimal Link Condition effect such that anaphoric elements like infinitival T and Person cannot match and inherit values from infinitive external elements across a spelled out left edge, much as argued for Germanic topic drop in Maling (2007a, 2007b) . I leave it at that.
Concluding remarks
Despite much discussion, the received understanding of PRO, 'Case' and EPP has not progressed markedly over the last 30 years. The evidence showing that Icelandic PRO is case-marked is overwhelming, and much of it has been widely accessible since Sigurðsson (1991) . Nonetheless, Chomsky and Lasnik (1993) suggested that PRO "can bear null Case", adding, within parentheses, "though it may have other Cases as well, in non-standard conditions that we will not review here" (see Chomsky 1995: 119) . Boeckx and Hornstein (2006: 603ff) argue against 'null Case' but they share with Chomsky and Lasnik the belief that nominative morphology in Icelandic infinitives simply cannot be regular nominative morphology "as there is no source for structural nominative in the embedded clause " (2006: 596) .
At the heart of the misinterpretation lies the belief that structural nominative differs from putative so-called 'default' nominative in that only structural nominative correlates with finite verb agreement. Evidently, however, there is no inherent correlation between nominative case and agreement, just partial overlapping. Rather, finite verb agreement takes place in morphology whenever it can. That is, the following holds for Icelandic and similar languages:
(96) The finite verb agrees iff it can probe a CP-internal NP that is not inherently case-marked (or inside a PP); otherwise, it takes a non-agreeing default 3SG form.
This is understandable if inherent case is an agreement of a kind (Sigurðsson 2003) , NPs commonly (but not universally) being blocked from signaling more than one morphological agreement relation (i.e., this is a common morphological restriction, not a syntactic one). Nominative case, in turn, triggers finite verb agreement when it is 'successfully' probed by a finite verb, otherwise it naturally does not.
Boeckx and Hornstein's goal to prune unnecessary theoretical machinery is, as such, an example of natural, not to say 'coerced', minimalistic efforts. However, what we need to prune is not PRO but the 'Case' theoretic understanding of it. Plainly, the silence of PRO is unrelated to case and movement, and hence the fact that Icelandic PRO is abstractly assigned case in morphology, quirky or nominative, is derivationally irrelevant. The problem is not PRO and its case-marking, but the mistaken belief that left edge lexicalization is nominative case in some deep sense. It is not, not any more than permission to cross a road is green light in some deep sense. The two often co-occur, in particular in case poor languages like English, but there is no inherent relation between them.
Person, in contrast, is a meaningful and a syntactically active category, having some of the properties and effects that have mistakenly been attributed to 'Case'. PRO infinitives are Person defective, not case defective.
